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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
T. COLLINS JACKSON, 
PlaivntiJff and Appellant, 
vs 
KENDRICK HARWARD, BLAIN C. 
CURTIS, HEBER CHRISTIAN-
SON, McKAY LARSON, TEX R. 
OLSEN, SPENCER OLIN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
9000 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
·The Defendants propounded interrogatories to the 
Plaintiff (Tr. 13-16) requiring Plaintiff to state in detail 
and with particularity the acts, omissions or conduct 
of each of the Defendants upon which Plaintiff based his 
cause of action (Tr. 13). To this the Plaintiff answered 
that the Defendants, in concert with one another, "par-
ticipated in the installation and operation of a television 
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2 
booster rebroadcasting station in contravention of the 
laws of the State of Utah and of the Federal Govern-
ment" (Tr. 20, 21). 
The Plaintiff further admitted, in discovery proceed-
ings, that (A) he has no license or permit from the F.C.C. 
(Tr. 21) (B) he has no franchise from any county, city, 
or other local authority ( Tr. 21) (C) he was in violation 
of his contract with Telluride Power to carry his lines 
(Tr. 21, 32, 33) (D) he was operating under an assumed 
name without any registration thereof (Tr. 27) (E) he 
is capturing a fugitive signal without paying any con-
sideration therefor or participating in the production 
thereof ( Tr. 21). 
At the hearing below the Plaintiff received, over 
the objection of the Defendants, leave to amend his 
answers to the interrogatories which he later did in an 
apparently desperate attempt to fabricate a justiciable 
issue upon which he could go to trial. (Tr. 44) 
STATEl\1:ENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY GRANTED THE RE-
SPONDENTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT .. 
A. 'THE APPELLANT, ASSUMING ALL ALLEGATIONS 
OF HIS COMPLAINT ARE TRUE, HAS PLEADED NO RIGHT 
WHI·CH MAY BE PROTECTED AT LAW OR IN EQUITY. 
B. THE APPELLANT, ASSUMING THE ALLEGA'TIONS 
OF HIS COMPLAINT ARE TRUE, HAS PLEADED NO DUTY 
ON THE PART OF THE RESPONDENTS WHICH HAS 
BEEN VIOLATED. 
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THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY GRANTED THE RE-
SPONDENTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT .. 
A. 'THE APPELLANT, ASSUMING ALL ALLEGATIONS 
OF HIS COMPLAINT ARE TRUE, HAS PLEADED NO RIGHT 
WHI.CH MAY BE PROTECTED AT LAW OR IN EQUITY. 
B. THE APPELLANT, ASSUMING THE ALLEGA'TIONS 
OF HIS COMPLAINT ARE 'TRUE, HAS PLEADED NO DUTY 
ON THE PART OF THE RESPONDENTS WHICH HAS 
BEEN VIOLA'TED. 
The Respondents brought their Motion before the 
Trial Court for a Summary Judgment within that spirit 
of the Rules expressed in Barron and Holtzoff, Volume 
3 Page 58 to the effect that 
a Summary Judgment is intended to prevent 
vexation and delay, improve the machinery of 
justice, promote the expeditious disposition of 
cases and avoid unnecessary trials. 
The underlying basis of the Respondents' Motion is 
that the elements of any cause of action, i.e. : a primary 
right and a corresponding duty, are entirely both absent 
from the claims of the Appellant. As stated in Volume 
1 American Jurisprudence Page 418, Actions, Section 21 : 
A cause of action arises out of an antecedent 
primary right superior to that of the offending 
party. It is axiomatic that there can be no wrong 
without a corresponding right and no breach of 
duty by one person without a corresponding right 
belonging to some other person. The existence of 
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a legal right is, accordingly, an essential element 
of the cause of action, inasmuch as a Plaintiff 
must recover on the strength of his own case in-
stead of the weakness of the Defendant's case, 
since it is his right, instead of the Defendant's 
wrong doing, that is the basis of recovery. 
This is the set of rules upon which these Respon-
dents presented their Motion below and the Argument 
is necessarily divided into two main headings: 
A. THE ABSEN·CE OF A LEGAL PRIMARY 
RIGHT IN THE PLAINTIFF 
B. THE NON-EXISTENCE OF ANY LEGAL 
DUTY ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANTS 
A. The Plaintiff comes before this Court admitting 
in the pleadings, in the Answers to the Interrogatories, 
and Responses to the Demands for Admissions, that he 
is deficient in all of the following particulars: 
1. That he has no license or permit from the Fed-
eral Communication Commission or from any other 
governmental or administrative body (TR 21). 
2. That he has no franchise from Sevier County in 
violation of Article XII. Section 8 of the l-;-tah Constitu-
tion and Section 17-5-39 UCA 1953 (TR 21). 
3. That he has no franchise, license, or permit from 
any 1nunicipality within Sevier County, in violation of 
the smnP constitutional provision and Section 10-8-14 
UCA 1953. (TR 22) 
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4. That during all times material to these proceed-
ings, he has been subject to a contract authorizing the 
use of utility poles for carrying his line which provides 
as a condition precedent that he must secure all local 
franchises required by law. ( TR 21, 32, 33) 
5. That at all times material to these proceedings 
he has operated under an unregistered assumed name, 
contrary to the provisions of Section 42-2-1 UCA 1953. 
(TR 27) 
6. That he has been capturing a fugitive television 
signal without paying any consideration for or contribut-
ing to the production thereof. ('TR 21) 
7. That he is "a receiver" rather than "a broad-
caster" and as a receiver is attempting to "reap where 
he has not sown" (See Volume 15 ALR 2d, Page 791). 
(Tr. 21) 
In justification of these facts, the Appellant has 
stated variously that he does have a property right in 
the fugitive signal although it has cost him nothing for 
its production; that he can acquire franchises and rights 
to use public easements, roads and highways by prescrip-
tion and that at the time he installed his apparatus in 
Sevier County he was requested to do so by its inhabi-
tants. 
The Appellant contends that since he is a "receiver" 
rather than a "broadcaster" he is not subject to regula-
tion by the Federal Communications Commission or any 
other governmental or administrative body. 
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In 20th Century Sporting Club, Inc. v. MassachU-
setts Char~table Association and the other cases cited at 
Pages 791 of 15 ALR 2d, it has been held unequivocally 
that a "receiver" has no property right in a signal and 
in fact may be enjoined from taking advantage of the 
telecast of productions to permit members of the public 
to view the program on the Defendant's television screen. 
These cases manifestly and unanimously hold that there 
can be no property right in a fugitive signal captured 
by an interloper and thus they all defeat Plaintiff's ar-
gument that he has a right in a signal which he admits 
he intercepts without paying therefor any consideration 
but has nevertheless transmitted on to residents of Sevier 
County for his own economic gain. 
\Y e strongly urge upon the Court that for those 
reasons alone the Plaintiff is vested with no legal pri-
mary right protectable by law and this action quite cor-
rectly was summarily dismissed. 
However, the Appellant is lacking not only in this 
particular, itself dispositive entirely of the Motion, but 
should have had his proceeding dismissed as they were 
below for the reason that there -was no duty on the part 
of the Defendants to avoid any harm or injury, if in 
fact any harm or injury occurred, to the Appellant. 
B. THE NON EXISTENCE OF A DUTY ON 
THE PART OF THE DEFENDANTS. 
We maintain that the Defendants haYe not been, at 
any t.imf' material to these proceedings or at any other 
t imP. in violation of any State or Federal Law or Regu-
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lation. We maintain that these Defendants, under the 
provisions of Chapter 22, Section 1, Laws of Utah 1957, 
were required, upon a finding that adequate economical 
and proper television could not be made available to 
the public by ·private sources, to equip and maintain any 
type of transmission or relay facilities that could bring 
television to the inhabitants of Sevier County. 
The District Court has heretofore held that the stat-
ute contemplates and provides a public purpose and 
therefore is constitutional. An appeal taken from that 
ruling by the Plaintiff has been dismissed. (See Supreme 
Court of Utah No. 8902, Civil No. 4955 Sevier County). 
The Plaintiff cannot contend that the type of facili-
ties which are being operated by the Defendants are in 
violation of any federal statute or any regulations in 
view of C. J. Comm~mity Services v. Federal Communi-
cations Commission, 246 Federal 2d, Page 660, a 1958 
case where it was held that the Federal Communications 
Commission in the public interest, and when warranted 
by circumstances indicating public necessity and the pub-
lic welfare, had the discretion to permit operation of a 
booster system. In that case the Court of Appeals for 
the Circuit of the District of Columbia held : 
"The Federal Communications Commission 
says in effect that instead of serving the public 
interest by making reception by "boosters" avail-
able it has no alternative whatever but the ouster 
of the booster. 
We think there is an alternative. The Com-
mission's decision noted that "The Rules and 
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standards do not now provide for the licens1 
operation of such an installation" thus despite t: 
Commission's clear duty to provide for the u 
of such channels throughout the past 22 years 
the Commission's life, it has failed to adopt rul 
under which signals may be picked up, reinvigo 
ated and made available to the residents of tl 
town. We suggest therefore that the Cornmissi< 
may well get on with the rule making proceedml 
apparently contemplated as a means of filling 
the service area of television stations. We say th: 
the Commission acted mistakenly in its belief th: 
it lacked discretion to withhold the issuance 1 
a cease and desist order and that upon this po~ 
the Commission's order must be reversed. 
This decision clearly holds that there is no violatic 
either of a federal law or a federal regulation in t1 
operation of a "booster" type apparatus. This holdii 
would bring the type of installation being operated 1 
the Defendants within the purview of Chapter 22 Lav 
of 1957, wherein there is authorized among other typ1 
of facilities any "that is authorized by law for purpo: 
of supplying television to the people." 
If these Defendants have not acted in contraventi< 
of any federal, state, or administrative law. rule, ~ 
regulation then the Plaintiff's case n1ust fail for th: 
rf'a~on alone since there is non-existence of any duty < 
the l mrt of these Defendants to avoid injury to the Plai 
tiff, even if it be assmned that he suffered injury whic 
as wP have contended under sub-heading A, is also abser 
Hoing one ~tPp further. howeYer, and assumii 
(which wf' do not ad1nit) that there was a violation 1 
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the rules of the Federal Communications Commission, 
how can it be said that the establishment of a regulation 
of that Commission can bestow upon a private individual 
a civil remedy against an individual violating the same. 
The extension of the principle allowing redress to a per-
son injured by the violation of a criminal statute to em-
brace situations wherein an administrative body enacts 
a regulation pursuant to a law would place an unreason-
able and in fact absurd burden upon those individuals 
who must deal with regulatory agencies. They would be 
faced with the intolerable threat of having the laws 
changed from day to day by individuals not subject to 
recall by election or direct control from any source but 
who could alternately bestow and take away a civil right 
without going through the legislative process. 
If the Plaintiff is claiming that a violation of a 
federal regulation by these Defendants has given rise 
to a cause of action in his favor the complete answer is 
that creation of administrative rules and regulations do 
not confer such a right. 
Even were we to assume that the existence of ad-
ministrative regulations confers upon those subject there-
to a duty the breach of which gives rise to a civil action 
in favor of an individual injured thereby, still the Plain-
tiff is remediless for the reasons expressed in Volume 
50, American Jurisprudence 582, Statutes, Section 586, 
where it is stated : 
"The legislative intent to grant or withhold a 
private right of action for the violation of the 
statute, or the failure to perform a statutory duty, 
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10 
is determined primarily from the form or langu. 
age of the statute. The nature of the evil sought 
to be remedied and the purpose it was intended 
to accomplish may also be taken into considera-
tion; in this respect the general rule is that a 
statute which does not purport to establish a civil 
liability, but merely makes provisions to secure 
~he safety or welfare of the public as an entity, 
Is not subject to a construction establishing a 
civil liability." 
Certainly the adoption of any federal regulation 
would have as its purpose the protection of the public 
and not the protection of a trespasser who is intercepting 
a signal as a mere volunteer. The nature of the evil 
sought to be remedied is not the evil of competing or 
scrambling for a fugitive signal. A statute does not pur-
port to establish a civil liability where it is designed 
merely to make provisions to secure the welfare of the 
public. The purpose of any regulation of the Federal 
Communications Commission designed to decrease in-
terference in the channels is to protect the public or the 
consu1ner and not to protect individuals who are not 
licensed and who have no rights under or sanctioned by 
the Con11nission, or by any other governmental regula-
tory agency. 
By the srune token. eYen should the statute be said 
to hnpose a duty upon these Defendants, the violation 
of whieh duty would be actionable in the Courts, then the 
Plaintiff cannot avail himself of that construction since 
lw 18 not one of the class entitled to take advantage of 
I .. 
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the law. 50 Am. Jur. 582, Statutes Sec. 587, where it is 
said: 
"An action for the violation of a statutory 
duty is maintainable by one who is of a class en-
titled to take advantage of the law intended to be 
protected by the Statute and for the benefit of 
whom the statute was enacted. Indeed even though 
the violation of the statute is regarded as action-
able, it is generally required that the injury be 
done to one of the class designed to be protected 
by the statute or for whose benefit the statute 
was enacted and to whom a duty of compliance 
with the statute is owed. It has also been stated 
as a general rule that a statutory right of action 
may be maintained only for the benefit of the 
person specified in this statute:-. 
The Federal Communications regulations are all, 
where dealing with interdictions against interference, 
aimed at prohibiting interference with the signal of other 
licensees. The Plaintiff here admits in the interroga-
tories he has no such license, and as he stated in his oral 
argument, he is not even a broadcastor and therefore 
certainly not within the class of people entitled to benefit 
by any rules and regulations of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission or laws creating that Commission. 
The Plaintiff has alleged in his Complaint that all 
these Defendants are officers of Sevier County and yet 
in oral argument upon the motion, he has contended that 
they are sued in their private capacity. This demonstrates 
that the Plaintiff has finally realized that he is in an 
• impossible dilemma in determining which course to pur-
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12 
sue and that in either event he has no action against 1 
Defendants. 
First, if he sues these individuals alleging that 
are public officials or acted as public officials in 
conduct complained of in the complaint, then he is f: 
squarely with the decision in Hjorth et al. vs. Wh~l 
burg, 121 Utah 324, 241 Pac. 2d 907, wherein it is sta 
It is the general rule of law that stat~ 
municipal officials performing a duty imp< 
upon them by statute and exercising in good £ 
the judgment and discretion necessary there: 
are not liable personally in damages for inju 
to private individuals resulting as a conseqm 
of their official act. 
It must necessarily be as so held, othen 
public officials would be fearful to act at the : 
of finding themselves personan~~ liable for : 
done in good faith in performance of their dut 
On the other hand if the Plaintiff complains 1 
these Defendants are acting individually and in com 
to do him damage then he is faced mth the proposi1 
that all of the provisions of the Ftah State Law, (wl 
he argues prohibits the activity complained of) mus1 
disregarded since all those principles and provisi 
which the Plaintiff has cited and argued have been 
gued by hiin as prohibiting only the activity of govE 
1nental ageneies in the field of teleYision and televiE 
rebroadcasting. The Defendants then would be equall~ 
entitled as the Plaintiff to attempt to intercept and 
broadea~t or tran~mit an:- fugitiYe signals which t 
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13 
could capture from any source whatsoever and distribute 
the same to all the residents of Sevier County. Plaintiff, 
if he pursues this theory, must abandon all claim of a 
violation of State Statutes. 
It is clear, we submit, that the Defendants have vio-
lated neither a federal nor a state statute; that they have 
done only that permitted by the law authorizing local 
governments to furnish television to remotely situated 
areas, and only that which Plaintiff has been doing for 
several years. 
The Plaintiff clearly is asking for freedom from 
competition rather than freedom to compete with others. 
It is his contention that his business has been destroyed 
by attempts on the part of the D'efendants to provide 
citizens of Sevier County with adequate, economical and 
proper television and that their operation is in violation 
of nebulous rules, regulations and statutes whereas he 
is exempt, himself, from all of the same. 
In short, the Plaintiff contends that the Defendants 
have no legal right to do a thing which he has no legal 
right to do himself. 
We have searched the pleadings and proceedings 
thoroughly in an attempt to discover any assertable right 
which the Plaintiff has, and can find none. He has no 
: affirmative interest in property but only the asserted 
claim that the Defendants are doing something which 
1 is interdicted by regulations of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission, yet the Community Service Case cited 
above holds that even federal regulations have not been 
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violated. He does not show that he affirmatively has 
any right either to do the acts which he claims constituted 
his business which was damaged or any interest which 
may be protected in law or in which he may assert a 
claim of property. His entire case is that the wealmess 
of the Defendants' position entitles him to recover from 
them. We have amply demonstrated, however, that the 
position of the Defendants is not weak, but is in fact 
based upon privileges on a parity with, or even superior 
to, those of the Plaintiff. 
The following are our observation concerning the 
Brief of the Appellant: 
The Appellant in his desperation to find a theory 
upon which relief can be granted him has scatter-gunned 
the entire field of tort law attempting to grasp upon some 
cogent basis for obtaining relief and has claimed some 
remedy under what he calls "six theories." 
Examination of all six demonstrates that he has pre-
supposed, without even arguing, that he has a primary 
legal right which he can assert, and a property interest 
which the law can protect. 
'V e would be seriously imposing upon the Court's 
tilne to reiterate the many reasons expressed above why 
thP Plaintiff has neither an assertable right nor a prop-
prf~· int(:'l'P~t. or the Defendants any lawful duty, for the 
enforce1nent of which the Plaintiff may have recourse 
to the Con rts ; nevertheless we think it proper to com-
Inent hri('fly on those six theories which the Plaintiff 
elaims prP~Pnt isslH's justiciable before this Court 
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First, he states that this action is brought for a 
trespass to the Plaintiff's property and business inter-
ests. We have demonstrated that the Plaintiff has neither 
a business nor a property interest unless it can be said 
that he is entitled to a Decree of this Court protecting 
him against competition. As we stated previously, he is 
a mere volunteer, intercepting a fugitive signal which 
is not, as he states in his brief, "his signal," but is the 
signal of the originator who could enjoin the Plaintiff 
from rebroadcasting the same (15 ALR 2d 791). 
Plaintiff secondly claims that the Defendants were 
negligent. If the Plaintiff has no legal right or property 
interest which can be protected by the courts it is im-
material whether or not a person acts negligently even 
though some damage may result to the Plaintiff. There 
must be a concurrence of a right, a duty, and a wrong 
and without any one of those elements a cause of action 
fails. Vol. 1 Am. Jur. 422, Action, Section 27. 
The Plaintiff states that his third cause of action 
involves a nuisance by reason of continuing trespasses. 
If there are no trespasses there are no nuisances. 
The Plaintiff claims that his fourth cause of action 
proceeds on the theory that the Defendants have induced 
the Plaintiff's customers to breach their contracts with 
him. The complete answer to this contention is that the 
Plaintiff, under any view of facts, has no right to contract 
:with any persons because he has nothing to give them in 
consideration for their promise to pay or their payment 
to him of fees for his services. 
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The Plaintiff's claim here can be likened to a per-
son suing another for interfering with his contract to 
sell the Brooklyn Bridge. 
The Plaintiff states that his fifth cause of action 
is for a conspiracy. In Trautwein v. Harbourt, 40 N.J. 
S. 247, 123 A. 2d 30, 59 ALR 2d 1277 it is held: 
"A conspiracy can not be made the subject of 
a civil action unless something is done which, 
without the conspiracy, would give a right of 
action." 
In Lewis v. Turner, 314 Pac. 2d 625, it is held: 
"Where the facts and circumstances relied 
upon to establish a conspiracy are as consistent 
with a lawful or honest purpose as with an unlaw-
ful undertaking, they are insufficient." 
In Beardsley v. Kilmer, 321 Xew York, N. Y. 80, 
140 K. E. 203, a case controlling the facts in the issue at 
bar, it was held that even though one object of persons 
in establishing a newspaper in a city was to punish the 
publisher of another newspaper for attacks made upon 
them by such paper there is no right of action for con-
spiracy if some of the objects of the competing newspa-
per were to give the community a first class journal and 
to protect themselves against the other newspaper by 
driving it out of business. 
II Prt:) there ct>rta inl~- was no intention to drive any-
one out of business ; but assuming there were, no cause 
of action would accrue. 
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The Plaintiff asserts that his sixth cause of action 
alleges malice in committing the torts which he claims 
damaged the Plaintiff. Malice is, we admit, a question 
of fact, but even if malice is proved there must be an 
accompanying legal wrong otherwise there is no cause 
of action. A person can do a thing maliciously and unless 
his malice is accompanied by a legal "wrong" it is not 
actionable per se. There is a very clear statement of this 
principle found in Am. J ur. Vol. 1 p. 420, where it is 
stated: 
"A malicious motive or a mere intention to 
do wrong, not connected with the infringement of 
a legal right, can not be made the subject of a 
civil action, for malice, of itself, as a state of 
mind, is not a wrong for which the law gives re-
dress. Accordingly it may be laid down as a gen-
eral rule that a rightful or legal act or the exercise 
of a legal right, is not rendered actionable as a 
wrong to another by virtue of a bad intent with 
which it was done or the existence of a malicious 
motive that prompted it." 
The rule is very clearly stated in an annotation in 54 
Am. St. Rep. 886: 
"Whatever a man has a legal right to do he 
may do with impunity and without raising a cause 
of action against himself because of bad motives 
if he exercises his legal right in a legal way, eve~ 
though damage results to another." 
Thus we have demonstrated, we submit, that the Plain-
tiff must show a "wrong" committed by the Defendants 
in addit~on to showing that there is a right in the Plain-
tiff which can be protected. We submit that not only 
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has he failed to show both but that he has failed to show 
e~ther. 
The Plaintiff, in the face of the holding in C. J. 
Community Services v. F.C.C., 246 F 2d 660, nonetheless 
claims that "boosters are still unlawful." The case holds 
explicitly that the F.C.C. has absolute discretion to issue 
or withhold a "cease and desist order" against a booster 
television station and that each such case 1nust be 
weighed upon its own merits considering public conveni-
ence, interest, and necessity, and that boosters as such 
are not outlawed per se, but only when the Conmrission 
finds that they in fact constitute, in the specific instance, 
an intereference with other licensed comn1unications. 
As amazing as it may sound, this is the "statutory vio-
lation" upon which Plaintiff bases his cause of action 
against these Defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that this Plaintiff has so 
utterly failed to show any semblance of a cause of action 




Attorney for Respondents 
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